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Abstract: To satisfy the property of expected-utility maximization, Tzeng et al.
(2012) modify the almost second-degree stochastic dominance proposed by Leshno and
Levy (2002) and dene almost higher-degree stochastic dominance. In this note, we
further investigate the relevant properties. We dene an almost third-degree stochastic
dominance in the same way that Leshno and Levy (2002) dene second-degree stochastic
dominance and show that Leshno and Levy's (2002) almost stochastic dominance has
the hierarchy property but not expected-utility maximization. In contrast, Tzeng et al.'s
(2012) denition has the property of expected-utility maximization but not the hierarchy
property. This phenomenon also holds for higher-degree stochastic dominance for these
two concepts. Thus, the ndings in this paper suggest that Leshno and Levy's (2002)
denitions of ASSD and ATSD might be better than those dened by Tzeng et al. (2012)
if the hierarchy property is considered to be an important issue.
Keywords : Almost stochastic dominance; expected-utility maximization; hierarchy of
stochastic dominance.
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1 Introduction
The theory of almost stochastic dominance (ASD) developed by Leshno and Levy (LL,
2002) plays an important role in several elds, particularly in nancial research, and has
drawn several important applications; see, for example, Levy (2006, 2009), Bali, et al.
(2009), and Levy, et al. (2010). However, Tzeng et al. (THS, 2012) nd an example that
the almost second-degree stochastic dominance (ASSD) does not possess the property
of expected-utility maximization. They modify the ASSD denition and show that the
modied ASSD obtains the property of expected-utility maximization. It is well known
that SD has the property of expected-utility maximization. However, it is also well known
that SD has another important property { the property of hierarchy. In this paper we
compare the performance of these two denitions of ASSD by investigating whether they
both have the hierarchy property as the theory of standard stochastic dominance (SD)
possesses.
In addition, in this paper we dene the almost third-degree stochastic dominance
(ATSD) in the same way that Leshno and Levy (2002) dene ASSD and compare the
performance of this ATSD with the ATSD used in Tzeng et al. (2012). Interestingly, we
nd that ASSD and ATSD as dened by Leshno and Levy (2002) or used the concept of
Leshno and Levy (2002) possess the hierarchy property, while ASSD and ATSD as dened
by Tzeng et al. (2012) do not. Thus, the ndings in this paper suggest that Tzeng et
al.'s (2012) denitions of ASSD and ATSD are not better than Leshno and Levy's (2002)
denition of ASSD and the ATSD using the concept of Leshno and Levy (2002) if one
considers possessing the hierarchy property to be an important issue.
2 Notations and Denitions
To describe the ASD concepts proposed by Leshno and Levy (2002) and Tzeng et al.
(2012), we rst state the denitions and notations to be used in this paper. Suppose
that random variables X and Y dened on the support 
 = [x; x] have the correspond-
ing distribution functions F and G, respectively. The following notations will be used
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throughout this paper:
H(1) = H and H(n)(x) =
Z x
x
H(n 1)(t)dt for H = F;G and n = 2; 3 ;
F (n)  G(n) = Z x
x
F (n)(x) G(n)(x)dx for n = 1; 2; 3 ; (2.1)
S1(F;G) =

x 2 [x; x] : G(x) < F (x)	 ; and
Sn(F;G) =

x 2 Sn 1(F;G) : G(n)(x) < F (n)(x)
	
;
S^n(F;G) =

x 2 [x; x] : G(n)(x) < F (n)(x)	 for n = 2; 3 :
An individual chooses between F and G in accordance with a consistent set of pref-
erences satisfying the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) consistency properties. Accord-
ingly, F is preferred to G if EF (u)   EG(u)  0 where EF (u) 
R x
x
u(x)dF (x) and
EG(u) 
R x
x
u(x)dG(x).
To distinguish the ASSD proposed by Leshno and Levy (2002) from that dened by
Tzeng et al. (2012), in this paper we use ASSDLL and ASSDTHS to represent the ASSDs
proposed by Leshno and Levy (2002) and Tzeng et al. (2012), respectively. In addition,
we use ATSDLL to indicate ATSD that we dene in the same way that Leshno and
Levy (2002) dene ASSD and we use ATSDTHS to correspond to Tzeng et al.'s (2012)
denition. We rst state the denitions of the almost rst-degree stochastic dominance
(AFSD) and ASSDLL dened by Leshno and Levy (2002) as follows:
Denition 2.1 For 0 <  < 1=2,
AFSD: F is said to dominate G by -AFSD, denoted by F almost()1 G, if and only ifZ
S1

F (x) G(x)dx  F  G; and (2.2)
ASSDLL: F is said to dominate G by -ASSDLL , denoted by F almost()
2LL
G, if and only
if Z
S2

F (x) G(x)dx  F  G and EF (X)  EG(X) ; (2.3)
where Sn = Sn(F;G) for n = 1; 2 and jjF  Gjj are dened in (2.1).
Tzeng et al. (2012) dene ASSDTHS and ATSDTHS as follows:
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Denition 2.2 For 0 <  < 1=2,
ASSDTHS: F is said to dominate G by -ASSDTHS, denoted by F almost()
2THS
G, if and
only ifZ
S^2

F (2)(x) G(2)(x)dx  F (2)  G(2) and EF (X)  EG(X) ; (2.4)
ATSDTHS: F is said to dominate G by -ATSDTHS, denoted by F almost()
3THS
G, if and
only ifZ
S^3

F (3)(x) G(3)(x)dx  F (3)  G(3) and G(n)(x)  F (n)(x)  0 for n = 2; 3 ;(2.5)
where S^n = S^n(F;G), F
(n), G(n), and jjF (n) G(n)jj are dened in (2.1) for n = 2 and 3.
In this note, we dene ATSDLL in the same way that Leshno and Levy (2002) dene
ASSDLL as shown in the following:
Denition 2.3 For 0 <  < 1=2,
ATSDLL: F is said to dominate G by -ATSDLL, denoted by F almost()
3LL
G, if and only
if Z
S3

F (x) G(x)dx  F  G and EF (X)  EG(X) ; (2.6)
where S3 = S3(F;G) and jjF  Gjj are dened in (2.1).
Remark 2.1 We note that if one incorporates the idea of Denition 2.2 into Denition
2.1, one may suggest replacing the conditions stated in (2.6) with the following conditions
for ASSDLL:Z
S3
[F (x) G(x)]dx  jjF  Gjj and G(n)(x)  F (n)(x)  0 for n = 2; 3 : (2.7)
However, because EF (X)  EG(X) = G(2)(x)  F (2)(x), conditions stated in equation
(2.7) add condition G(3)(x)   F (3)(x)  0 to equation (2.6). Nevertheless, if conditions
stated in equation (2.7) are used, the property of hierarchy will not hold. For example,
consider the example discussed in Appendix A; one can easily show that F dominates G
by ASSDLL. On the other hand, by using this example, we have G(3)(1) = 1
2
(1   1
3
)2 =
2
9
< F (3)(1) = 1
4
, and thus, the property of hierarchy does not hold. In this connection, in
this paper we will only use Denition 2.3 with the conditions stated in equation (2.6) to
dene ATSDLL.
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Before we continue our discussion, we rst state the sets of utility functions as shown
in the following denition:
Denition 2.4 For n = 1; 2 and 3, u 2 Un or Un() is a utility function such that
Un = fu : ( 1)iu(i)  0 ; i = 1;    ; ng and
Un() =

u 2 Un : ( 1)n+1u(n)(x)  inff( 1)n+1u(n)(x)g[1=  1] 8x
	
:
3 The Theory
3.1 Expected-Utility Maximization
The stochastic dominance approach is regarded as one of the most useful tools for rank-
ing investment prospects when there is uncertainty because it possesses the property of
expected-utility maximization that ranking assets by FSD, SSD, and TSD is equivalent
to expected-utility maximization for investors with utility functions u 2 U1, U2, and U3,
respectively (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Whitmore, 1970).
It is interesting to examine whether almost SD possesses a property of expected-
utility maximization similar to SD. Leshno and Levy (2002) show that ranking assets by
AFSD is equivalent to expected-utility maximization for investors with utility functions
u 2 U1 (). Nevertheless, Tzeng et al. (2012) show that ranking assets by ASSDLL is not
equivalent to expected-utility maximization for investors with utility functions u 2 U2 ().
They then dene ASSDTHS and show that, on the contrary, ranking assets by ASSDTHS
is equivalent to expected-utility maximization for investors with utility functions u 2
U2 (). In addition, they dene AnSD
THS and show that ranking assets by AnSDTHS
is equivalent to expected-utility maximization for investors with utility functions u 2
Un() for n > 2. Thus, the rst aim of this paper is to examine whether ranking assets
by ATSDLL, the newly dened ATSD in this paper, is equivalent to expected-utility
maximization for investors with utility functions u 2 U3 (). Together with the nding
from Tzeng et al. (2012), we state the property of non-expected-utility maximization for
both ASSDLL and ATSDLL in the following property:
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Property 3.1 (Non-Expected-Utility Maximization of both ASSDLL and ATSDLL)
1. There exists utility function u 2 U2 () such that EF (u) < EG(u) even when F
dominates G by -ASSDLL
 
F almost()
2LL
G

, for some  < 1=2.
2. There exists utility function u 2 U3 () such that EF (u) < EG(u) even when F
dominates G by -ATSDLL
 
F almost()
3LL
G

for some  < 1=2.
Readers may refer to Tzeng et al. (2012) for the example being constructed to show Part
1 of Property 3.1. In this paper we will construct an example to show Part 2 of Property
3.1 in Appendix A.
3.2 Hierarchy
It is well known that SD possesses the expected-utility maximization property. How-
ever, SD also has another important property { the property of hierarchy { that FSD
implies SSD, which, in turn, implies TSD. In this paper, we discover that the AnSDTHS
introduced by THS does not possess the property of hierarchy as stated in the following
property for n = 1; 2, and 3:1
Property 3.2 (Non-Hierarchy of AnSDTHS)
1. If F dominates G by -AFSD
 
F almost()1 G

for some  < 1=2, it is not necessary
that F dominates G by -ASSDTHS
 
F almost()
2THS
G

for some  < 1=2.
2. If F dominates G by -ASSDTHS
 
F almost()
2THS
G

for some  < 1=2, it is not
necessary that F dominates G by -ATSDTHS
 
F almost()
2THS
G

for some  < 1=2.
We will construct two examples for Property 3.2 in Appendix B. Nonetheless, we nd
that ASSDLL possesses the property of hierarchy as shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 (Hierarchy of AnSDLL)
1We note that one could easily extend our work to n > 3. However, though some studies, see, for
example, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010), study risk to n > 3, most
academics and practitioners are only interested in studying the case up to n = 3. Thus, we stop at n = 3.
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1. If F dominates G by -AFSD
 
F almost()1 G

for some  < 1=2, then F will
dominate G by -ASSDLL
 
F almost()
2LL
G

for some  < 1=2.
2. If F dominates G by -ASSDLL
 
F almost()
2LL
G

for some  < 1=2, then F will
dominate G by -ATSDLL
 
F almost()
3LL
G

for some  < 1=2.
4 Concluding Remarks
The ndings in this paper lead us to conclude that if expected-utility maximization is
used to measure ASD, AnSDTHS is preferred to AnSDLL. However, when hierarchy is
considered, AnSDLL is preferred.
Appendix
Appendix A. An example for Part 2 of Property 3.1:
Let x 2 [0; 1]. Assume that there are two payo distributions such that
F (x) =
8<: 12 if 0  x < 11 if x = 1 and G(x) =
8<: 0 if 0 < x < 131 if 1
3
 x
: (A.1)
Figure A.1 exhibits the plots of F and G. In Appendix B, we show that F dominates
G by -AFSD. According to Theorem 3.1, one could easily nd that F dominates G by
-ATSDLL (F almost()
3LL
G). Nevertheless, one could easily nd an investor with a utility
function u 2 U3 () who strictly prefers G to F ; i.e, EF (u) < EG(u). Here, we suggest one
as follows:
u(x) = x3   3:5x2 + 5x with 0  x  1:
Some simple computations can show that u belongs to U3 () for all 0 <  < 1=2. On the
other hand, we can have EF (u) = u(0)
1
2
+ u(1)1
2
= 1:25 and EG(u) = u(
1
3
) = 1:3148 >
EF (u). This conrms that the assertions in Property 3.1 hold. 
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Appendix B. Examples for Property 3.2:
Construct an example for part 1 of Property 3.2. We use the same distributions F and
G as those in (A.1). We have EF (X) = 1=2 and EG(X) = 1=3 and obtain the following
F (2)(x) =
8<: 12x if 0  x < 1;1
2
if x = 1;
; G(2)(x) =
8<: 0 if 0 < x < 13 ;x  1
3
if 1
3
 x;
;
S1(F;G) =

x : G(x) < F (x)g = fx : x 2 [0; 1=3]	 ;
S^2(F;G) =

x : G(2)(x) < F (2)(x)g = fx : x 2 [0; 2=3]	 :
Thus, according to Denition 2.1 for the AFSD, it is obvious that F dominates G by
-AFSD with, e.g.
 
R
S1

F (x) G(x)dxF  G = 1=61=2 = 1=3:
However, there is no ASSDTHS as shown in the following:Z
S^2

F (2)(x) G(2)(x)dx = Z 13
0
1
2
xdx+
Z 2
3
1
3
(
1
2
x  x+ 1
3
)dx
=
1
4
 1
9
+
1
3
 1
3
  1
4
(
4
9
  1
9
) =
1
18
and Z
S^C2

G(2)(x)  F (2)(x)dx = Z 1
2
3
(x  1
3
  1
2
x)dx
=
1
4
 (1  4
9
)  1
3
 1
3
=
1
36
in which S^C2 is a complement of S^2. As a result, we haveZ
S^2

F (2)(x) G(2)(x)dx = 2
3
F (2)  G(2);
which implies that F does not dominate G by the ASSDTHS. This conrms Part 1 of
Property 3.2.
We turn to constructing an example for part 2 of Property 3.2. Let x 2 [0; 1] and we
choose F from (A.1) and select G to be
G(x) =
8<: 0 if 0 < x < 141 if 1
4
 x
: (A.2)
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Then, we have EF (X) = 1=2 and EG(X) = 1=4 and obtain the following:
G(2)(x) =
8<: 0 if 0 < x < 14x  1
4
if 1
4
 x
; F (3)(x) =
8<: 14x2 if 0  x < 11
4
if x = 1
;
G(3)(x) =
8<: 0 if 0 < x < 141
2
(x  1
4
)2 if 1
4
 x
;
S1(F;G) =

x : G(x) < F (x)g = fx : x 2 [0; 1=4]	 ;
S^2(F;G) =

x : G(2)(x) < F (2)(x)g = fx : x 2 [0; 1=2]	 ;
S^3(F;G) =

x : G(3)(x) < F (3)(x)g = fx : x 2 [0; (2 +
p
2)=4]
	
:
We are now ready to show that F dominates G by the ASSDTHS. Note that we can haveZ
S^2

F (2)(x) G(2)(x)dx = Z 14
0
1
2
xdx+
Z 2
4
1
4
(
1
2
x  x+ 1
4
)dx =
1
32
and Z
S^C2

G(2)(x)  F (2)(x)dx = Z 1
2
4
(x  1
4
  1
2
x)dx =
1
16
:
As a result, we get Z
S^2

F (2)(x) G(2)(x)dx = 1
3
F (2)  G(2) ;
and thus, F dominates G by the ASSDTHS.
On the other hand, though we can have G(2)(1) = 3=4 > 1=2 = F (2)(1) and G(3)(1) =
9=32 > 1=4 = F (3)(1), F does not dominate G by the ATSDTHS. We show this argument
in the following. We rst obtainZ
S^3

F (3)(x) G(2)(x)dx = Z 14
0
1
4
x2dx+
Z 2+p2
4
1
4

1
4
x2   1
2
(x  1
4
)2

dx
= 0:0152
and Z
S^C3

G(3)(x)  F (3)(x)dx = Z 1
2+
p
2
4

1
2
(x  1
4
)2   1
4
x2

dx
= 0:0022:
Thus, we get Z
S^3

F (3)(x) G(3)(x)dx > 1
2
F (3)  G(3) ;
which implies that F does not dominate G by the ATSDTHS and conrm the assertion
in Property 3.2. 
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